Previous research has shown that short-term fasting in healthy individuals (HIs) is 26 associated with changes in risky decision-making. The current experiment was designed to examine 27 the influence of short-term fasting in HIs on four types of impulsivity: reflection impulsivity, risky 28 decision-making, delay aversion, and action inhibition. HIs were tested twice, once when fasted for 29 20 hours, and once when satiated. Participants demonstrated impaired action inhibition when fasted; 30 committing significantly more errors of commission during a food-related Affective Shifting Task. 31 Participants also displayed decreased reflection impulsivity when fasted, opening significantly more 32 boxes during the Information Sampling Task (IST). There were no significant differences in 33 performance between fasted and satiated sessions for risky decision-making or delay aversion.
Introduction 44
Impulsivity has been defined as behaviour that can lead to undesirable consequences, is 45 inappropriate to the circumstance, risky, or ill-considered (1). Impulsivity can be categorised into 46 several subtypes, assessed through self-report and behavioural measures [2, 3] , and is widely 47 138 the index finger using the Freestyle Freedom Lite Blood Glucose Monitoring System, supplied by 139 Abbott Diabetes Care, UK (www.abbottdiabetescare.co.uk) . All behavioural tasks were 140 administered on a laptop computer, positioned approximately 60cm from the participant. 141 Participants were renumerated a the standard university rate for their participation. Questionnaire-6 (EDEQ-6; Fairburn & Beglin, 1994) , to measure ED symptoms; the State-Trait 148 Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) , to measure 149 anxiety; and The Impulsive Behaviour Scale (UPPS; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) , to asses 150 impulsivity [39] [40] [41] . Additionally, participants filled in a hunger questionnaire that consisted of four 151 Likert scales measuring hunger, desire to eat, the amount of food the participant could eat, and 152 fullness. Participants were also asked to rate from not at all to very much so how much they were 153 experiencing each of the following: dry mouth, stomach aches, anxiety, dizziness, weakness, 154 nausea, thirst, headache, and stomach growling. A composite score was calculated by adding 155 together the four likert ratings associated with the subjective hunger and the nine ratings of physical 156 side effects. A higher score indicated higher levels of self-reported hunger. 161 The Information Sampling Task (IST) measures the degree to which participants sample 162 information before making a decision, whilst placing minimal demands on visual processing and 163 working memory. Participants are shown a 5x5 matrix of 25 grey boxes and are told that each grey 164 box covers one of two possible colours. Participants must decide which colour they think is in the 165 majority, and can click to uncover as many boxes as they wish before deciding. Once opened, boxes 166 remain visible for the remainder of that trial. Correct decisions in the Fixed Win (FW) condition 167 are awarded 100 points, irrespective of number of boxes opened. In the Decreasing Win (DW) 168 condition the number of points to be won decreases by 10 points with every box opened. Therefore 169 in the DW condition participants must tolerate higher uncertainty to win a high number of points as 170 sampling information to a point of high certainty would win few points. Temporal discounting is the degree to which individuals discount future rewards, such as 175 deciding whether to spend in the near future or whether to save for the further future, (8). Subjects 176 generally prefer near (spending) to far (saving) rewards, consistent with values being discounted in 177 line with the relevant time delay (temporal discounting). The steeper the discounting, the greater the 178 impulsivity. Participants were asked to choose between two serially presented options of differing 179 magnitude ranging from a monetary value of £1 to £100, and a time delay of one week to one year.
180
The rate at which future rewards are discounted (k) is used as a measure of delay aversion.
181
Participants with a greater discount rate devalue future rewards more quickly. Participants were told 182 that one of the options they chose would be randomly selected and paid for on a pre-paid card with 183 a timed activation date, as used in the original study [23] . However, they were debriefed at the end 184 of the task and no payment was made. The task also contained 20 trials in which one of the choices 185 presented was always larger and available sooner. These 'catch' trials were used to determine the 186 subject was paying attention to, and understood the task. consisting of 20 trials presented in a pseudorandom order. There are eight repetitions of each of 10 197 trial types, including "gain only" and "loss only" trials. Participants were given 100 points at the 198 beginning of each game and instructed to win as many points as possible. After each trial feedback 199 was given on performance and an updated score was displayed for two seconds.
200
Standard trial types always contained a control gamble (50/50 chance of winning 10 points) 201 and an experimental gamble. The experimental gamble varies in the probability of winning to be 202 either high or low (75 vs. 25), expected gains are either large or small (80 vs. 20 points) and 203 expected losses either large or small (80 vs. 20 points), producing eight trial types. The other two 204 trial types, 'gain only' and 'loss only' were used to estimate risk-aversion when choosing between 205 losses, and risk-seeking when choosing between gains. In a 'gains only' trial, two options with the 206 same expected value are presented. For example, if participants more frequently choose a 100% 207 chance of a gain of £20 when compared to a 50% chance of gaining £40, they would be exhibiting 208 risk-aversion for gains. Similarly, in a 'loss only' trial, two options of equal expected value are 209 presented, such as a 50% chance of a £40 loss, compared to a 100% chance of a £20 loss. If 210 participants are more likely to choose the 50% chance of a £40 loss, they would be exhibiting risk-211 seeking for losses. omissions. There were 10 blocks (2 practice blocks) with 18 stimuli presented in each block, 227 arranged in either of the following orders: FFHHFFHHFF, HHFFHHFFHH. This order means that 228 four blocks were 'shift' blocks, in which participants had to respond to stimuli that were previously 229 distractors, and inhibit responding to previous targets. In the 'non-shift' blocks participants had to 230 continue responding to the same targets and inhibiting responses to the same distractors as in the 231 immediately previous block. Note that this was the only one of the included tasks which 232 incorporated food stimuli. To examine the effect of fasting on risky decision-making, multivariate analysis was 262 conducted on the number of times participants choose the experimental, over the control, gamble 263 (proportionate choice) and the mean deliberation times associated with these choices. The 264 proportionate choices were arcsine transformed prior to statistical analysis in line with Rogers, (32) .
265
However, all values presented in tables are untransformed scores, for ease of interpretation.
266
The proportionate choices were analysed using a within subjects repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 267 x 2 ANOVA with the factors of session (fast vs. satiated), probability (high vs. low), expected gains 268 (large vs. small), and expected losses (large vs. small). This ANOVA was then repeated with mean 269 deliberation times (ms) as the dependent variable.
270
The 'gains only' and 'losses only' trials were analysed using a within subjects repeated 271 measures 2 x 2 ANOVA with session (fast vs. satiated), and trial type ('gains only' vs. 'losses 272 only'). Analysis was conducted on both proportion and deliberation times separately. 
Results

281
Demographic characteristics and questionnaire scores are displayed in Table 1 Participants made a higher number of errors during the satiated session, and more errors during the 335 DW condition, see Table 2 for mean scores and standard deviations. showed that there was no difference in the number of commission errors made towards household 415 items between fasted and satiated sessions, for either shift (p= 0.33) or non-shift (p=0.23) blocks.
416
There was also no difference in commission errors towards food stimuli for fasted or satiated 417 sessions during the non-shift block (p = 0.44). However, there was a significant difference in the 
Errors of Omission 423
There was no main effect of Session F(1,32)=0.62, p = 0.44 or Stimuli F(1,32) The results of the IST were contrary to the hypothesis that short-term fasting would be 476 associated with increased reflection impulsivity. The decreased reflection impulsivity displayed 477 during the fasted session could be due to a number of different factors. Firstly, the ability to flexibly 478 shift attention between decision making (deciding which box colour is in the majority), and the 479 action of box opening could be affected by fasting, causing the 'repetitive' box opening during the 480 FW condition. This is unlike the DW condition, in which participants are cued by the decreasing 481 points to shift from opening boxes to make a decision about which colour is in the majority. shifting is the process of changing, or switching, between responding to different tasks, rules, or Results from the current study indicate that short-term fasting did not affect delay aversion.
503
Participants in the fasted condition did not choose to delay the receipt of a monetary reward any less 504 than when satiated. However, participants may have been less susceptible to the fasting 505 manipulation as the hypothetical on-screen choices are viewed as more distant, compared to 506 immediate presentation, and are more objectively assessed (38). The degree to which an individual 507 discounts future rewards has also been described as a trait characteristic (39), and is stable over time 508 (40, 41) . Therefore manipulating the state of the individual (fasting) may not influence an 509 established trait discount rate towards monetary rewards.
511
Participants also showed no difference between fasted and satiated sessions for the different 512 probabilities of winning, different magnitudes of expected losses, and expected gains on the Choice 513
x Risk Task. This indicates that risky decision-making was not influenced by short-term fasting.
514
This finding is in contrast to previous research that found increased risky decision-making for food, 515 water, and money following four hours of food and water deprivation [36] . However, this could be 516 related to differences in the salience of the reward as participants in the current study received 517 points rather than food, water, or money, which may be differentially affected by fasting.
518
Additionally, exploratory analysis of fasted state on risk preferences in Levy and colleagues' study 519 revealed a small effect (5% change) that appeared to be related to the baseline characteristics of the 520 included sample [36] .
522
Another study demonstrated that risky decision-making decreased when fasted participants 523 were provided with a meal to reach satiation. However, this study involved exclusively male 524 participants [37], whereas, the participants in the current study were all female. Hence, gender 525 differences might account for the inconsistent results, especially when males and females have been 526 shown to respond to fasting differently (42). Furthermore, the effect on risky decision-making in the 527 previous study was only significant immediately after a satiated meal but not one hour later
528
[37].This appears to be in line with the current lack of effect of fasting given that participants in the 529 current study were told to eat normally prior to the satiated session, and were not provided with 530 food during task completion which took between 30 and 60 minutes. A limitation of the current experiment is the inability to address whether the differences 553 found between fasted and satiated sessions is due to the primary effect of lowered blood glucose on 554 brain function, or the secondary effect of hunger (induced through fasting) influencing motivation, 555 or fatigue. Previous research indicates that changes in cognition can be independent of blood 556 glucose, and may be mediated by other factors (43), and could be controlled by homeostatic 557 mechanisms not assessed in the current study (44).
559
Green and colleagues have previously found that although there was a significant difference 560 between self-reported hunger for fasted and satiated sessions, task performance was not affected.
561
This indicates that subjective measures of hunger may not always relate to differences in task 562 performance. The tasks in the current study for which there were non-significant findings may not 563 have sensitive enough to detect subtle differences in performance that could occur as a result of 564 fasting(45). Further research is needed in order to examine the role of subjective hunger on 565 cognition and to separate out the influence of primary and secondary effects of fasting on cognitive 566 performance.
568
Furthermore, the fasting manipulation might not have increased the value of a monetary 569 reward, but instead increased the value of a food reward. Previous studies have demonstrated that 570 nicotine deprivation can lead to a steeper discounting rate for cigarettes, but not monetary rewards 571 (46). This demonstrates that state manipulations can have differential effects on the impulsive 572 choices made in response to different rewards. The present findings are therefore only applicable to 573 monetary rewards, and future studies should investigate food rewards using this paradigm. This 574 could also account for the non-significant findings during the delay aversion and risky-decision 575 making task, which used monetary values as rewards. However, the present results show that 576 general delay aversion towards money did not differ as a function of fasting. Including food stimuli 577 during the temporal discounting task could make the results difficult to interpret. It might be hard to 578 separate impulsiveness towards food items as a result of fasting from the increased value of food 579 items caused by food deprivation.
581
It is clear that further studies need to be conducted in order to better understand the effect of 582 short-term fasting in healthy participants. Research should continue to investigate the most 583 appropriate design in which to examine the role of short-term fasting on cognitive performance. In 584 the meantime, caution should be used when interpreting findings from ED participants, particularly 585 BN, as indicative of trait differences in cognitive performance due to the influence of fasted state on 586 these measures.
587
